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Abstract 
We tested whether an alternative lineup procedure designed to minimize problematic influences 
(e.g., metacognitive development) on decision criteria could be effectively used by children and 
improve child eyewitness identification performance relative to a standard identification task. 
516 children (6- to 13-year-olds) watched a video of a target reading word lists and, the next day, 
made confidence ratings for each lineup member or standard categorical decisions for 8 lineup 
members presented sequentially. Two algorithms were applied to classify confidence ratings into 
categorical decisions and facilitate comparisons across conditions. The classification algorithms 
produced accuracy rates for the confidence rating procedure that were comparable to the 
categorical procedure. These findings demonstrate that children can use a ratings-based 
procedure to discriminate between previously seen and unseen faces. In turn, this invites more 
nuanced and empirical consideration of ratings-based identification evidence as a probabilistic 
index of guilt that may attenuate problematic social influences on child witnesses’ decision 
criteria. 
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Public Significance Statement 
Child eyewitnesses are prone to choosing incorrectly from traditional identification lineups. This 
research demonstrates that children's confidence ratings can provide meaningful information 
about the quality of their memories for faces and the degree to which they recognize previously 
seen or unseen faces presented in identification lineups. 
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How sure are you that this is the man you saw? Child witnesses can use confidence 
judgments to identify a target 
Even in the most ideal situation eyewitness identifications can be inaccurate (Wells & 
Olson, 2003)—this is especially true for child eyewitnesses who are more likely than adult 
eyewitnesses to identify an innocent person from a perpetrator-absent lineup (Fitzgerald & Price, 
2015). Given the fallibility of eyewitness memory, the approaches traditionally used to 
administer lineups to witnesses have been scrutinized (Brewer & Wells, 2011; Wells, Memon, & 
Penrod, 2006). In response to this scrutiny, an alternative approach to improving accuracy with 
adult eyewitnesses was developed to mitigate factors that may influence witnesses’ decision 
criteria and increase error rates (Brewer, Weber, Wootton, & Lindsay, 2012; Sauer, Brewer, & 
Weber, 2008; Weber & Varga, 2012). The alternative approach permits eyewitnesses to provide 
a confidence judgment for each lineup member (reflecting their likelihood of guilt), rather than a 
traditional categorical decision. An algorithm that uses the distribution of confidence ratings can 
then be applied to derive identification and rejection classifications. This procedure has been 
effective at increasing accuracy for adult witnesses, particularly for perpetrator-absent lineups.  
Child eyewitnesses, however, present a unique problem to the legal system. Research 
consistently demonstrates that child eyewitnesses are prone to choosing incorrectly from a lineup 
–especially the youngest children studied, those aged 5-8 years (Fitzgerald & Price, 2015). 
Because of their tendency to choose, children are particularly challenged when the perpetrator is 
absent from the lineup (Fitzgerald & Price, 2015; Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1998). Children’s 
problematic choosing may reflect the setting of overly-lenient decision criteria (i.e., low 
threshold for selecting a lineup member) that results from peripheral factors, such as implicit 
social pressure to choose (Pozzulo, Dempsey, Bruer, & Sheahan, 2012). However, research has 
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yet to examine whether confidence ratings – a procedure that avoids single, explicit categorical 
decisions, potentially reducing the impact of non-diagnostic influences on criterion placement – 
can be used by children to effectively identify a target among foils in a lineup. We explored 
whether using confidence ratings could improve child eyewitness identification performance, 
relative to a standard identification task. 
Confidence Ratings as Indices of Memory 
The recognition memory literature has established a strong link between confidence and 
accuracy. Decision theories of recognition, including signal detection theory, generally posit that 
confidence represents the degree of match between a stimulus and an image in memory (Green 
& Swets, 1966; Leippe, 1980; Wickelgren & Norman, 1966). Similarly, evidence accumulator 
models propose that confidence represents the difference between the evidence that an item has 
been seen and the evidence that an item is new (Vickers, 1979). Viewing a previously seen item 
should create a stronger connection to memory than viewing a never-before-seen item. As a 
result, confidence tends to increase with accuracy (Norman & Wickelgren, 1965; Trow, 1923; 
Van Zandt, 2000).  
There is a long history of obtaining a confidence judgment as part of the eyewitness 
identification paradigm. Confidence judgments obtained immediately after the identification 
decision can be informative about likely accuracy (Brewer & Weber, 2008; Brewer & Wells, 
2006; Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996), provided that the information has been processed under 
favorable conditions (Deffenbacher, 1980), a positive identification has been made (Sporer, 
Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995), and no administrator feedback has been given (Wells & 
Bradfield, 1998). To be clear, an expression of high confidence in an identification decision is by 
no means conclusive evidence that the decision was accurate. Confident witnesses can be wrong. 
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However, when aggregated across individuals, a relation between confidence and accuracy is 
typically found, particularly if calibration analyses are performed (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Juslin 
et al., 1996).  
As mentioned above, a new use of confidence has recently emerged in the eyewitness 
identification literature. The conventional role of confidence ratings in eyewitness procedures 
has been to supplement a categorical lineup decision with a single post-identification confidence 
rating (e.g., how confident are you in your final decision?). Rather than asking witnesses to rate 
their confidence in an identification decision, Sauer and colleagues (2008) asked participants to 
provide a confidence rating for each lineup member, indexing the likelihood that the lineup 
member in question was the perpetrator (without making a categorical identification). Their 
objective was to minimize problematic influences on decision criteria (e.g., demand 
characteristics). An additional benefit of this method was that witnesses made confidence 
decisions for each lineup member, rather than using all the information in the full lineup to make 
a single categorical decision followed by a single confidence rating. Thus, the confidence 
procedure reduced the amount of information that witnesses had to sort through into more 
manageable judgments and provided a richer source of information about the extent to which 
individual lineup members matched witnesses’ memory for the culprit. 
Sauer et al. (2008) applied an algorithm to derive a positive (i.e., choosing or making an 
identification) or negative (i.e., not choosing or rejecting) classification from the witnesses’ 
confidence judgments. Following the application of the algorithm, the confidence procedure 
yielded accuracy rates comparable to traditional, categorical decisions when the target was 
present and provided a considerable advantage when the target was absent. These results suggest 
that confidence ratings can be used by adult witnesses to accurately discriminate previously seen 
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from unseen faces (i.e., confidence served as an index of recognition memory). Subsequent 
research has confirmed that adults possess the metacognitive ability to give confidence ratings 
that indicate the degree of match between each picture and their memory of the perpetrator 
(Brewer et al., 2012; Sauer et al., 2012). Whether children are able to use confidence ratings 
similarly remains an empirical question.  
Children as Eyewitnesses 
The cause of children’s propensity to choose is not fully understood, but it is likely the 
result of a convergence of memory, cognitive development, and social-influence factors (e.g., 
Beal, Schmitt, & Dekle, 1995; Pozzulo et al., 2012). There have been several attempts made to 
reduce children’s choosing during lineups (e.g., Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1999; Price & Fitzgerald, 
2016; Zajac & Karageorge, 2008). While these attempts have found some success, children’s 
high rate of choosing continues to be a problem (see Fitzgerald & Price, 2015).  
Age differences in choosing may be explained by children’s use of overly-lenient 
decision criteria (Humphries, Holliday, & Flowe, 2012). The ability to monitor and regulate 
decision criteria is dependent on metacognitive abilities (Flavell & Wellman, 1977; Haller, 
Child, & Walberg, 1988) that develop through childhood and into adolescence (e.g., Bryce & 
Whitebread, 2012; Keast, Brewer, & Wells, 2007; Roebers, 2002). With limited ability to 
monitor and regulate their cognitive processes, children—especially children younger than 9 
years old (e.g., Koriat, Goldsmith, Schneider, & Nakash-Dura, 2001; Roebers & Howie, 2003)—
may not be able to recognize memory limitations and adjust their decision criterion accordingly. 
Dunlevy and Cherryman (2013) argued that when a target is absent from a lineup, children (aged 
6 to 7) adjust their decision criteria—but not in the desired direction. Instead of using more 
conservative criteria (high threshold when selecting a lineup member) when there is no close 
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match or when their memory for a perpetrator is weak, children appear to use more lenient 
decision criteria.  
Children’s use of lenient decision criteria is likely augmented by perceived pressure to 
choose and a desire to acquiesce. An eyewitness identification task involves a level of implicit 
pressure to pick someone. Participants may believe that choosing none of the lineup members 
gives the impression that they are unwilling to complete the task (Wells & Luus, 1990). Children 
(4- to 11-years-old) appear to be especially vulnerable to this type of social pressure due to 
exaggerated power/authority differences between a child and an interviewer (Beal et al., 1995; 
Parker & Ryan, 1993; Pozzulo et al., 2012). Thus, children may choose from lineups because 
they want to please their interviewer.  
Given their propensity to choose, children might benefit from a procedure that 
encourages more conservative responding. Sequential presentation of lineup images has been 
demonstrated to make adults more conservative (e.g., Palmer & Brewer, 2012; Steblay, Dysart & 
Wells, 2011). However, presenting lineup members individually still results in high choosing 
rates in children (Lindsay, Pozzulo, Craig, Lee, & Corber, 1997; Parker & Ryan, 1993; Pozzulo 
& Lindsay, 1998). Children have also been found to choose more than one lineup member—
likely due to the use of lenient decision criteria or trouble understanding the task. However, 
adjusting a lineup task to involve a number of smaller confidence decisions, rather than a single 
categorical decision, may help to minimize problematic influences on children’s decision 
criteria.  
Children and Confidence Ratings 
Although a positive relation between confidence and accuracy has been demonstrated for 
adult witnesses (e.g., Juslin et al., 1996; Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh, 2013; Sauer, 
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Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010), there is little evidence of a similar relation in children (Brewer 
& Day, 2005; Keast et al., 2007). Specifically, when children (10- to- 13-years old) pick from a 
lineup, they show greater overconfidence and poorer calibration (cf. adults; Keast et al., 2007). 
However, in previous lineup research with children, the task involved a retrospective judgment 
of confidence about a categorical identification. Findings in the developmental metacognitive 
literature suggest children may nevertheless be able to use confidence as an index of memory, 
thus suggesting the lineup literature has just not yet found how to make such a procedure work 
for child witnesses. 
Basic metacognitive processing develops during pre-school years (Schneider & Lockl, 
2008) and there is evidence that children as young as 8 years old can monitor the accuracy of 
retrieved memories and strategically regulate the reporting of memories to improve accuracy 
(e.g., Koriat et al., 2001; Roebers & Howie, 2003). Hiller and Weber (2013) recently explored 
the role of confidence and metacognitive development in a word-pair recognition task that 
required discrimination of seen from unseen stimuli (akin to a lineup task). Although children’s 
(8- to 12-year-olds) confidence ratings were less well calibrated than adults’ (i.e., the degree of 
correspondence between the level of confidence expressed for, and the probable accuracy of, a 
given response was weaker), higher confidence ratings were still associated with more accurate 
decisions. Importantly, despite children’s overconfidence, similar levels of confidence-based 
discrimination were found between children and adults.  
Instructing children to rate their confidence that each lineup member is the target may be 
an effective method to capitalize on the utility of confidence information. If children’s higher 
false identification rates (cf. adults) stem from the nature of the traditional eyewitness task 
(Hiller & Weber, 2013), then using a method that circumvents a typical lineup decision may be 
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more reliable. With a confidence rating procedure, children are not required to make a single, 
categorical lineup identification and instead are only asked to rate their confidence as to whether 
each lineup member is the target. Contrary to a categorical task, a confidence rating procedure 
minimizes the need for children to consider the possibility that the target is not in the lineup. 
Children need only consider the relative likelihood that each lineup member is the target, which 
seems to be within the range of children’s metacognitive abilities (Roebers & Howie, 2003).  
A confidence rating procedure also changes the lineup task from a single decision 
involving numerous stimuli to a series of responses, each to a single stimulus, which may be 
particularly advantageous for children. Making a categorical lineup identification requires 
complex processing (i.e., assessing which one face matches their memory of the target better 
than other faces) that induces a large cognitive load and, in turn, may negatively impact 
performance (Hiller & Weber, 2013; Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1999). Circumventing the need for a 
child to make a categorical identification could reduce the cognitive load associated with the 
task, alleviate inherent pressure to choose that is associated with making a single, categorical 
identification (Beal et al., 1995; Price & Fitzgerald, 2016) and mitigate problems associated with 
use of overly-lenient decision criteria. Thus, children may be able to use confidence ratings to 
discriminate previously seen from unseen faces.  
Present Study 
The goals of this research were two-fold. Our primary goal was to assess the utility of a 
confidence paradigm with school-aged children. That is, can children use confidence ratings to 
accurately discriminate a previously seen face from previously unseen faces? Can children’s 
confidence ratings be used as an index of recognition? Our second objective was to see how the 
accuracy of children’s responses from the confidence procedure would compare to a categorical 
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procedure – in this case, a sequential categorical procedure. A sequential presentation style was 
used to compare categorical and confidence procedures because confidence ratings are most 
useful when they index the similarity of a lineup member to memory; sequential presentation 
reduces the possibility for relative similarity to interfere (cf. simultaneous presentation).  
Children (aged 6-8 and 9-13 years) viewed a video of a target and then completed a 
categorical or confidence lineup procedure on the following day. For the confidence procedure, 
confidence ratings were collected for each lineup member and then classified as positive (those 
who made an identification) or negative (those who rejected the lineup) decisions (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996; Weber & Varga, 2012). These classifications were then compared to responses 
from children who made categorical lineup decisions. Both the confidence and categorical 
procedure presented the lineup members sequentially. We hypothesized that: (1) children’s 
confidence ratings could be used to discriminate between guilty and innocent suspects and (2) 
the confidence procedure would improve children’s response accuracy compared to the 
categorical procedure. This improved accuracy was expected to be driven by a reduction in 
inaccurate positive classifications. Moreover, considering the substantive improvements in meta-
cognitive abilities associated with development through this age group, we hypothesized that 
these anticipated improvements would be more pronounced for older than younger children. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
We recruited 516 children, 6- to 13-years-old (Mage = 8.89, SD = 1.88; 57% males), from 
local camps and after-school programs. This study was approved by the University of Regina 
Research Ethics Board. During program drop-off times, researchers discussed the study with 
parents/guardians, who signed consent forms if interested. Children with parental consent and 
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who themselves assented were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (response 
procedure: confidence, categorical) x 2 (target: present vs. absent) design. Due to the broad age 
range included in this study, we also examined age differences between younger (6- to 8-year-
olds, Mage = 7.18, SD = 0.77; 54% males) and older children (9- to 13-year-olds, Mage = 10.29, 
SD = 1.29; 60% males). These age groupings were chosen for a few reasons. First, a recent meta-
analysis reported that child eyewitnesses start performing more like adults on lineup tasks at 
around age 9 (Fitzgerald & Price, 2015). For the younger group, 6 through 8 years is a time 
period in which there is rapid change in cognitive development, particularly in meta-cognition. 
Meta-cognitive developments around the age of 9-10 years allow children to begin to perform at 
adult-like levels on some tasks (e.g., association/recall tasks; Schneider, 1986; Wellman, 1978). 
Thus, as children grow past 9 years of age, we can expect to observe a more gradual increase 
with an eventual plateauing of identification accuracy.  
Materials 
Target event and lineup stimuli. The video event and lineup stimuli were used in a 
previous study with children (Price & Fitzgerald, 2016). The video alternated between a woman 
performing magic tricks and a man reading word lists. The man reading word lists served as the 
target person. The video was just over 6 minutes long and, of that time, the target was in view for 
approximately 2 minutes. All lineups contained eight members, presented sequentially. Target-
present lineups comprised the target and seven fillers. Target-absent lineups comprised a 
designated “innocent suspect” and the same fillers as in the target-present lineup.  
Similarity ratings were obtained to guide selection of the innocent suspect and fillers. 
Independent raters (n = 35 adults) completed 200 trials in which the target person was presented 
alongside another person of the same race and sex. For each pair, raters were asked: “In terms of 
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physical appearance, how similar are these two individuals?” Ratings were completed on a 10-
point scale, ranging from 1 (highly dissimilar) to 10 (highly similar). Ratings ranged from 1.49 to 
6.06 (M = 3.51, SD = 0.78).  
In applied settings, lineups are typically constructed by matching fillers to the appearance 
of the suspect (Police Executive Research Forum, 2013). For target-absent lineups, this 
procedure has been theorized to lead to the selection of fillers who would not resemble the 
culprit to same degree as would an innocent suspect (Navon, 1992). Accordingly, the designated 
innocent suspect was the person with the highest similarity rating (M = 6.06). The average 
similarity ratings for the fillers (M = 4.34, SD = 0.37) were some of the highest in the set, but 
were all lower than the average rating for the innocent suspect.    
Confidence cup scale. Similar to previous research (e.g., Brewer & Day, 2005), children 
made confidence judgments using a 5-point scale containing numbers 0 through 4. In addition, 
each number was accompanied by a picture of a drinking glass with increasing levels of water in 
it (see Appendix A). A 5-point scale was used to avoid confusion stemming from a larger visual 
scale. For example, adjacent glasses in a 10-point scale would have had less noticeable 
differences in water. A 5-point scale allowed for a clear top, bottom, mid-point, and two half-
way to mid-points (see Appendix A). Previous researchers reported success using a similar visual 
scale with children (the Cup Scale; Weston, Boxer, & Heatherington, 1998).  
Procedure 
On the first day, children watched the video containing the male target as a group. The 
following day, a team of research assistants interviewed the children individually to administer 
the lineup task. Research assistants were blind to the identity of the target. After a short rapport-
building session, research assistants reminded the children about the target video and noted that 
CONFIDENCE JUDGMENT AND CHILD EYEWITNESSES  13 
 
the target person may or may not be in the stack of pictures. Children were told they could take 
as long as they needed to look at each picture. Research assistants showed participants eight 
lineup members sequentially, in a random order. Children made a decision for each lineup 
member before proceeding to the next. All lineup identification procedures and decisions were 
audio-recorded to ensure the research assistants followed the protocol. 
Confidence condition. For each picture, children used the confidence cup scale to 
indicate how sure they were that the picture depicted the target. Verbal instructions were 
accompanied by gestures to appropriate cups. Below are the instructions provided to the 
children: 
I don’t know what Jordan looks like, so I need you to help me figure out if his picture is 
in this pile. There might be a picture of Jordan in this pile or there might not be a picture 
of Jordan in this pile. Now I’m going to show you pictures one at a time. You can look at 
the picture for as long as you want. For each picture, I am going to ask you how sure you 
are that it is Jordan. Here are some pictures of cups with different amounts of water in 
them. I want you to tell me how sure you are by picking a cup with the right amount of 
water in it. It works like this: The more sure you are that the person is Jordan, the more 
water will be in the cup. If you are not really sure that it is Jordan, choose a cup that 
doesn’t have very much or any water in it. If you are a little bit sure but not too sure that 
it is Jordan, you should choose a cup that has some water in it but it shouldn’t be totally 
full. If you are really sure that it is Jordan, choose a cup that is almost or totally full. 
Does that all make sense? How sure are you that this is Jordan? 
Confidence Scale Check. In an initial check of children’s ability to use the confidence 
scale, a pilot study was conducted with ten children (Mage = 11.00) and children’s responses 
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indicated ability to understand and apply the scale. For an additional 334 participants who 
completed the full study, following the lineup task, we presented children with a similar visual 
analog scale (jars filled with jelly beans) and asked children to show which end of the scale 
indicated being not at all sure (and very sure). Children were then asked to place the jars in order 
of increasing confidence. For all children, this procedure took place following the lineup task and 
a brief distracter task and, thus, had no impact on their performance with the Cup Scale. Of those 
who completed the jelly bean task, 93% of children completed the task with no errors or 
guidance, while 7% had minor difficulty but could complete it with guidance.  
In addition, there was some concern that children would use the cup scale in a 
dichotomous or binary way (i.e., primarily selecting from either end of the scale). However, 
children used all response options on the cup scale and the distribution of responses at each 
possible option indicates willingness to spread across the scale, with an intuitively decreasing 
frequency with higher confidence ratings (younger children: 0 = 43%, 1 = 21%, 2 = 18%, 3 = 
10%, 4 = 8%; older children: 0 = 44%, 1 = 24%, 2 = 19%, 3 = 9%, 4 = 4%). 
Categorical condition. Participants in the categorical condition were instructed to 
provide a traditional yes/no decision indicating whether each picture depicted the man from the 
video:  
I don’t know what Jordan looks like, so I need you to help me figure out if his picture is 
in this pile. There might be a picture of Jordan in this pile or there might not be a picture 
of Jordan in this pile. I’m going to show you pictures one at a time. You can look at the 
picture for as long as you want. For each picture, I’m going to ask, “Is this Jordan?” If 
it’s Jordan’s picture, say “yes”. Remember though, Jordan’s picture might not be in the 
pile. If it’s not Jordan’s picture, say “no”. There’s one last thing you should know before 
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we get started. I want to ask you about all of the pictures, so even if you’ve already told 
me that one of the pictures is Jordan I’m going to keep asking you “Is this Jordan” until 
you’ve seen all the pictures. Does that all make sense? Is this Jordan? 
After each decision, children provided a post-identification confidence assessment using 
the same cup scale as in the confidence procedure condition. We compared the classification 
accuracy of those children who only made a confidence rating in the confidence procedure with 
children who made a post-identification confidence rating in the categorical procedure. For both 
age groups, we found evidence to support asking for confidence ratings alone rather than 
following a categorical decision (see Online Supplementary Materials for further discussion). 
Moreover, when a confidence rating was provided following a categorical decision, the response 
classification of the confidence ratings only mapped onto the categorical decisions in less than 
50% of the cases (45% for younger children, 49% for older children). 
After children viewed all pictures in the lineup, the next step depended on the number of 
‘yes’ decisions made, if any. If a single picture was selected, the procedure ended. If multiple 
selections were made, (n = 27 or 24% for younger children, n = 30 or 21% for older children) 
this was resolved by repeating the procedure and stopping after the first positive identification. 
Lastly, if children answered “no” to all lineup members, they were asked to provide an overall 
assessment of confidence to indicate how sure they were that the target was not shown; however, 
these results were not a focus of the present analyses.  
Classification Methods 
To determine classification accuracy for the confidence condition, confidence ratings 
were evaluated against a criterion, or critical value, that produced an estimate of the proportion 
of target-present trials that best matched the actual proportion of target-present trials (Koriat & 
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Goldsmith, 1996; Weber & Varga, 2012). This contrasts with Sauer and colleagues’ (2008; 
2012) approach, which maximized the proportion of correct decisions. However, as discussed by 
Weber and Varga (2012), the algorithms used by Sauer and colleagues may result in an artificial 
inflation of classification accuracy. To provide an unbiased comparison between lineup 
procedures, Weber and Varga optimized the data to closely match the designed proportion of 
target presence.  
We used Weber and Varga’s (2012) method by applying four previously-used 
classification algorithms to the children’s confidence ratings (Sauer et al., 2008, 2012). 
Specifically, we examined the C1 (i.e., MAX ONLY), C2 (i.e., MAX vs. NEXT), C3 (i.e., MAX 
vs. AVERAGE), and hierarchical classification methods. However, all examined classification 
methods produced similar results. For parsimony and to allow for comparison with previous 
research (e.g., Sauer et al., 2008), we report only the results of the C3 and hierarchical 
classification methods. For a complete description of the four classification methods see the 
Online Supplementary Materials.  
The Solver add-in function in Microsoft Excel (2010) was used to optimize (using the 
evolutionary method) a classification method’s criterion until the proportion of positive decisions 
classified deviated least from the proportion of target-present trials (see Weber & Varga, 2012). 
For example, given that 71 older children were assigned to a target-present lineup, we ran Solver 
until approximately the same number of responses was classified as positive. Each algorithm was 
maximized separately for each age group. Table 1 displays criterion scores for each algorithm. 
Table 1 
The identified criterion and optimized proportion of correct classifications for each method 
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  MAX vs. AVERAGE 
(C3) 
 
H1 
 
H2 
 
H 
Younger Criterion  1.73 0.20 2.05  
 Proportion of correct 
classifications 
50.86% 62.90% 74.00% 67.86% 
Older Criterion  1.68 0.90 0.56 - 
 Proportion of correct 
classifications 
59.29% 75.64% 64.52% 70.71% 
Note. H = hierarchical classification. The H proportion of correct classifications represents the average of the H1 
and H2 proportions. 
For each classification method, the associated criterion was used for categorizing 
confidence judgments as positive (identification) or negative (rejection) decisions. When using 
MAX vs. AVERAGE, the criterion represented the required difference between the picture that 
received the highest confidence rating and the average of all remaining confidence ratings. The 
hierarchical method (H) involved two steps. In the first step, a single criterion was calculated 
using only the confidence ratings for the suspect’s picture (H1). Next, another criterion was 
calculated using the confidence judgments from the remaining seven fillers (H2). Suspect 
confidence ratings that reached the H1 criterion were classified as positive identifications. Filler 
confidence ratings that reached the H2 criterion were classified as negative identifications (i.e., 
rejection) because they were known errors. Any decision that did not reach the H1 or H2 
criterion was considered to represent evidence too weak to be classified as either an 
identification or a rejection. Accordingly, these decisions were classified as ‘indeterminate’, 
which is conceptually similar to a “don’t know” response. For all classification methods, we 
applied the conservative approach used by Sauer et al. (2008), such that participants who did not 
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assign a unique maximum confidence rating to one of the eight pictures (e.g., multiple maxes, all 
zero confidence) were considered to have rejected the lineup.  
Results 
 To address our research questions, several analyses were performed. First, we explored 
different indices to examine children’s ability to use confidence ratings. Next, we compared the 
classifications of children’s responding in the confidence procedure with children’s decisions in 
the categorical procedure. Specifically, we examined for differences in suspect identification 
responses and response accuracy across these procedures. To further compare performance 
across procedures, diagnosticity and discrimination analyses were performed. Lastly, we 
conducted a profile analysis to examine the utility of children’s confidence ratings at an 
individual level. 
Can confidence ratings provided by children be used as an index of recognition? 
 We first investigated whether participants could use confidence ratings to discriminate 
previously seen (target) from unseen faces (fillers and innocent suspect). This is among the most 
important questions in the current work because evidence of children’s ability to effectively use 
confidence ratings to discriminate a target from unfamiliar faces would provide further 
justification for exploration of such a technique. The adjusted normalized discrimination index 
(ANDI) was calculated to provide a measure of how well participants’ confidence ratings of each 
lineup member discriminated guilty from innocent suspects (for the formulae, see Yaniv, Yates, 
& Smith, 1991). ANDI is a measure of variance in accuracy accounted for by confidence ratings 
and it ranges from 0 (no discrimination) to 1 (perfect discrimination). A bootstrapping procedure 
was used to compute .05% inferential confidence intervals. This procedure (see Palmer, Brewer, 
& Weber, 2010; Tryon, 2001) used the observed data as a sampling distribution and conducted 
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3000 replications to estimate variance of ANDI. This estimated variance provided the 
distribution needed to calculate confidence intervals. The ANDI scores revealed that both 
younger (.20, .05 ICI [.19, .22]) and older (.24, .05 ICI [.23, .25]) children were able to use 
confidence to discriminate a target from unseen faces: 20% and 24% of the variance in outcomes 
was explained by confidence ratings for younger and older children, respectively. 
As further evidence of how children used the confidence scale, we examined whether 
multiple confidence ratings provided by children could be used to accurately classify suspects as 
guilty or innocent. We calculated the proportion of correct classifications (correct identifications 
and correct rejections) using the classification methods described above (see Table 1). The high 
proportion of correct classifications suggest that children’s confidence ratings can be used to 
effectively classify previously seen (i.e., target) and unseen faces (innocent suspect and fillers).  
Accuracy in Target Present and Target Absent Lineups 
Classification outcomes of the algorithms are presented in Table 2. To avoid problems 
stemming from classifying filler identifications as either correct or incorrect across the different 
procedures, we classified responses into those who identified the suspect (guilty or innocent) and 
those who made another decision (filler, rejection, indeterminate). We conducted two separate 
hierarchical log-linear analyses (HILOG) with the decision to select the suspect (or not) as the 
dependent variable to determine whether the rate of suspect selections produced by each of the 
classifications algorithms varied by procedure, age, and target presence. Odds ratios (OR) are 
provided as a measure of effect size. ORs are the ratio of event occurrences (e.g., correct 
responses) to non-event occurrences (e.g., incorrect responses) and are calculated by dividing the 
odds of an event in one group by the odds in another group. An OR of 1 suggests that the two 
groups are not different. The interpretation of an OR depends on which event occurrence is used 
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as the numerator and denominator. For this study, the larger odds were used as the numerator to 
allow for intuitive interpretation. For example, an OR of 2.00 can be taken to mean that the odds 
of an event for one group (e.g., correct response) are two times greater than for the other group.  
C3 algorithm. The HILOG revealed no significant 4-way, χ2(1) = .07, p = .80, or 3-way 
interactions, χ2(4) = 2.78, p = .60. The highest level interaction was between two variables, χ2(2) 
= 101.83, p < .001. Partial associations revealed a 2-way interaction between target presence and 
suspect identifications, χ2 (1) = 97.24, p < .001, indicating that the number of suspect 
identifications was higher in the target-present condition than in the target-absent condition, z = 
10.51, p < .001, OR = 7.85, 95% CI [4.98, 12.37]. No significant interactions involving 
procedure (confidence/categorical) were detected.  
Hierarchical (H) algorithm. The HILOG revealed no significant 4-way, χ2(1) = .09, p = 
.77, or three-way interactions, χ2(4) = 4.04, p = .40. The highest level interaction was between 
two variables, χ2(2) = 96.63, p < .001. Partial associations revealed a 2-way interaction between 
target presence and suspect identifications, χ2 (1) = 94.36, p < .001, indicating that the number of 
suspect identifications made was higher in the target-present condition than in the target-absent 
condition, z = 10.41, p < .001, OR = 7.17, 95% CI [4.65, 11.07]. No significant interactions 
involving procedure (confidence/categorical) were detected.  
Table 2 
Classification proportions (standard errors) by target presence for confidence and categorical 
procedures 
  Categorical Confidence (C3) Confidence (H) 
 
TP TA TP TA TP TA 
Younger  
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    Suspect 0.41 (0.07) 0.12 (0.04) 0.45 (0.07) 0.10 (0.04) 0.52 (0.07) 0.16 (0.05) 
    Filler 0.25 (0.06) 0.29 (0.06) 0.10 (0.04) 0.33 (0.06) - - 
    Reject 0.34 (0.06) 0.59 (0.06) 0.45 (0.07) 0.57 (0.06) 0.48 (0.07) 0.78 (0.06) 
    Indeterminate         0.00 (0.00)  0.07 (0.03) 
N 56 59 58 58 58* 58* 
Older  
      
    Suspect 0.61 (0.06) 0.14 (0.04) 0.51 (0.06) 0.09 (0.04) 0.54 (0.06) 0.12 (0.04) 
    Filler 0.15 (0.04) 0.34 (0.06) 0.15 (0.04) 0.24 (0.05) - - 
    Reject 0.24 (0.05) 0.51 (0.06) 0.34 (0.06) 0.67 (0.06) 0.46 (0.06) 0.88 (0.04) 
    Indeterminate         0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 
N 75 70 71 66 71* 66* 
Note. TP = Target-present lineups; TA = Target-absent lineups. As outlined by Sauer et al., (2008), responses were 
not classified as filler identifications in the hierarchical (H) confidence method because they were assumed to be 
known errors and, as such, were classified as potential negative identifications (i.e., rejections). Indeterminate 
responses are only found in the H confidence method and represent confidence judgments considered too weak to be 
classified as either identifications or rejections. *The classifications for C3 and H were derived by applying different 
algorithms to the same confidence ratings (they are not from independent samples).  
Accuracy of Positive and Negative Responding 
In a forensic setting, investigators would not know whether a suspect is guilty or 
innocent. Therefore, to further explore the accuracy of the responses from the confidence 
procedure (cf. the categorical procedure), we divided responses into positive and negative 
classifications (see Table 3)—that is, those who ‘chose’ from the lineup or cases in which the 
algorithm returned a positive classification (positive) and those who did not ‘choose’ or cases in 
which the algorithm returned a negative classification (negative). Indeterminate responses were 
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neither classified as negative nor positive. It is important to note that any cases of multiple max 
ratings were classified as rejections (see Sauer et al., 2008), which potentially inflates the rate of 
negative classifications. For example, many younger children (n = 38, 33%) in the confidence 
procedure gave a maximum confidence rating higher than zero to multiple lineup members—of 
those, a third (n = 14, 36%) provided the guilty suspect with one of the maximum ratings. 
Likewise, many older children (n = 47, 33%) in the confidence procedure gave a maximum 
confidence rating to multiple lineup members—of those, a quarter (n = 12, 26%) provided the 
guilty suspect with one of the maximum ratings. Thus, our analyses represent a conservative test 
of the confidence procedure  
The C3 algorithm. A 2 (procedure: confidence-C3, categorical) x 2 (response 
classification: positive, negative) x 2 (age: 6-8, 9-13) x 2 (accuracy: correct, incorrect) HILOG 
revealed no three-way interaction between age, procedure, and accuracy, χ2 (1) = 0.02, p = .89 
and no three-way interaction between age, procedure, and response classification, χ2 (1) = 1.06, p 
= .30. Thus, we did not find any of the key effects of procedure, or interactions between 
procedure and age group. The only significant association was between response classification 
and accuracy, χ2 (1) = 13.78, p < .001, such that accuracy was higher for negative (.63, SE = 
0.06) than positive classifications (.47, SE = 0.17), z = 3.75, p < .01, OR = 1.95, 95% CI [1.37, 
2.77].  
The hierarchical (H) algorithm.  A separate HILOG compared performance using the 
hierarchical algorithm and categorical procedure, with an adjustment to the responses in the latter 
to facilitate a fair comparison between conditions. More specifically, filler identifications in the 
categorical condition were changed from positive classifications into correct (TA) or incorrect 
(TP) negative classifications in order to mimic the hierarchical algorithm’s classification method. 
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In line with previous research (Sauer et al., 2008), indeterminate responses calculated using the 
hierarchical (H) classification method were included in the denominator when calculating 
classification accuracy for the confidence procedure. This HILOG revealed a significant two-
way interaction between response classification and accuracy, χ2 (1) = 14.52, p < .001, such that 
positive responses were more accurate (0.80, SE = 0.07) than negative responses (0.64, SE = 
0.04), z = 4.10, p < .001, OR = 2.30, 95% CI [1.49, 3.56]. No other interactions were found.  
Table 3 
Accuracy rates, error estimates, and condition sample size for positive and negative responses. 
1 Note that these counts exclude indeterminate responses (younger children n = 4; older children n = 0) as 
indeterminate responses cannot be classified by response type. Standard errors are in parentheses and were derived 
from bootstrapping original data. 
   Positive Negative Total 
Younger  Categorical Accuracy 0.38 (0.06) 0.67 (0.05) 0.53 (0.05) 
  n 61 54 115 
 Confidence (C3) Accuracy 0.46 (0.06) 0.54 (0.05) 0.50 (0.05) 
  n 57 59 116 
 Categorical (Adjusted) Accuracy 0.77 (0.08) 0.61 (0.05) 0.65 (0.04) 
  n 30 85 115 
 Confidence (H) Accuracy 0.77(0.06) 0.62(0.04) 0.67 (0.04) 
  n1 39 73 112 
Older  Categorical Accuracy 0.51 (0.04) 0.67 (0.05) 0.57 (0.04) 
  n 92 54 146 
 Confidence (C3) Accuracy 0.52 (0.05) 0.65 (0.04) 0.58 (0.04) 
  n 69 68 137 
 Categorical (Adjusted) Accuracy 0.82 (0.05) 0.68 (0.04) 0.73 (0.04) 
  n 38 58 146 
 Confidence (H) Accuracy 0.83 (0.05) 0.64(0.03) 0.70 (0.03) 
  n 46 91 137 
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How do the Confidence and Categorical Procedures Compare in Diagnosticity and 
Discriminability? 
Diagnosticity. Diagnosticity ratios were used to measure the likelihood that an identified 
suspect was guilty (i.e., only suspect identification rates were considered). A diagnosticity ratio 
of 1.0 indicates that the two events (i.e., identified suspect is guilty versus identified suspect is 
innocent) are equally likely. Departure from 1.0 indicates differences in the probability of these 
two events. For example, a ratio of 2.0 indicates that children were twice as likely to identify the 
culprit as the innocent suspect. Thus, procedures with confidence intervals that do not overlap 
with 1 can be considered diagnostic. The diagnosticity ratios in Table 4 show that when a suspect 
was identified via the confidence procedure, the suspect identification was at least three times as 
likely to be guilty than to be innocent regardless of the algorithm or the age group. This result 
indicates that confidence ratings can be used with child eyewitnesses to diagnose whether an 
identified suspect is guilty or innocent.   
We compared diagnosticity ratios across procedures by calculating .05 inferential 
confidence intervals (ICI; Tryon, 2001) using a bootstrapping procedure (Palmer et al., 2010). In 
following the procedure laid out by Palmer et al. (2010), we first resampled the observed data 
3000 times and computed a diagnosticity ratio for each of the replicated samples. Then, to more 
closely approximate a normal distribution, we transformed the diagnosticity ratios to log scale 
(ln). Finally, the distribution was used to estimate the variance needed to calculate inferential 
confidence intervals (see Tryon, 2001). The inferential confidence intervals in Table 4 have been 
converted from log scale back to their original unit. Table 4 shows diagnosticity ratios were 
similar for the confidence (C3 and H) and categorical procedures.  
Table 4  
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Diagnosticity ratios and .05 inferential confidence intervals (ICI) 
   .05 ICI [Lower Limit, Upper Limit] 
 
 Diagnosticity ratio Confidence (C3) 
Confidence 
(H) 
Younger 
Children 
Categorical 3.46 [1.84, 6.50] [1.84, 6.48] 
 Confidence (C3) 4.33 [2.26, 8.31] - 
 Confidence (H) 3.33 - [1.97, 5.62] 
     
Older Children Categorical 4.35 [2.71, 6.99] [2.72, 6.96] 
 Confidence (C3) 5.58 [2.87, 10.80] - 
 Confidence (H) 4.42 - [2.48, 7.85] 
Note: .05 ICI = Inferential Confidence Intervals. ICIs allow for pairwise comparisons between 
diagnosticity ratios for each confidence procedure (i.e., C3 or H) and the categorical procedure within 
each age group. That is, comparisons of ICIs should be made within each column and not across age 
groups. 
Discriminability. Although diagnosticity ratios have traditionally been used to provide 
an overall assessment of lineup performance, this method has recently been criticized for its 
susceptibility to influences of response criterion (Wixted & Mickes, 2012). To avoid problems of 
inflated diagnosticity ratios, Mickes, Moreland, Clark and Wixted (2014) argued for 
discriminability in eyewitness identification tasks to be measured using the signal-detection 
statistic, d’, in the absence of the ability to calculate receiver operator characteristic (ROC) 
curves. However, as Palmer, Brewer and Weber (2010) point out, eyewitness identification 
decisions are not simple binary decisions (hit or miss for target-present stimulus; false alarm or 
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correct reject for target-absent stimulus), but in fact include an additional response type: filler 
selections. Using traditional SDT methods to calculate d’, these filler identification 
classifications pose a problem because they can be classified as either a false alarm or a miss, but 
are not always genuine examples of either response type. Some researchers have opted to treat 
filler identifications in target-present lineups as misses, thus excluding the responses in the 
calculation of d’ (e.g., Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, & MacLin, 2005; Mickes et al., 2014). In 
doing so, d’ can be conceptualized as an index of how well a group discriminates between guilty 
and innocent suspects, with a higher number indicative of better discrimination. Using this 
method, the d’ values for the C3, hierarchical, and categorical procedures for younger children 
were 1.13, 1.06, and 0.96, respectively, and for older children were 1.35, 1.26, and 1.36, 
respectively. However, a witness who incorrectly selects a filler is not, in memory or decision-
making terms, equivalent to a witness who views a lineup and, for whatever reason, elects not to 
pick anyone. 
Eyewitness identification can be conceptualized as a compound decision that involves 
two tasks: (a) detection or determining if the target is present in a group; and (b) identification or 
determining the correct target from the group (Duncan, 2006; Macmillian & Creelman, 1991; 
Palmer et al., 2010). To account for the complexity of compound decisions, Duncan (2006) 
proposed a compound decision model of signal detection theory (SDT-CD). SDT-CD generates 
expected probabilities of detection and identification and can be applied to estimate 
discrimination and response bias for lineup identification tasks (e.g., Palmer et al., 2010). 
For the detection component, the model generates estimates of how often a decision 
maker will choose in a target present lineup (also referred to as the hit rate in this model) and 
how often a decision maker will choose in a target-absent lineup (also referred to as the false 
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alarm rate in this model). In the SDT-CD model, a positive response to the detection component 
is dependent upon one of two decision rules that may be used by a decision maker. First, the 
independent observation rule proposes that each stimulus in an array is assessed separately 
against a single criterion. A positive response is made when at least one stimulus in the array 
meets the criterion. The second, or more global rule, is the integration rule in which each 
stimulus in the array is assigned a value and the sum of these values are compared against a 
criterion to make a decision. A positive response is made when the sum of the stimulus values 
meets or surpasses the criterion. 
The SDT-CD model is designed to generate expected probabilities of the identification 
component—or how often a decision maker will choose the correct target in a target-present 
lineup (correct identification rate). The decision rule for the identification component assumes 
that the decision maker will choose from the target-present array based on the probability that the 
similarity of the chosen stimulus with the intended target exceeds all of the remaining stimuli.  
Using these expected probabilities, the model then generates estimates of discriminability 
(d’) and response bias (c). These three expected probabilities (hit, false alarm, and correct 
identification rates) are then compared to the observed data. If good fit is found, then the model-
generated estimates of d’ and c can be used as reasonable estimates of discriminability and 
response bias of the observed data (Duncan, 2006; Palmer et al., 2010). Under the SDT-CD 
model, higher positive values of d’ indicate a respondent’s ability to distinguish between the 
target and non-target stimuli in the identification and detection components, with a d’ of zero 
indicating no discrimination. A c statistic indicates willingness to choose a target from the 
stimulus array. Positive c values indicate conservative responding, negative values indicate 
lenient responding, and a value of zero indicates no bias in responding. 
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We used the SDT-CD model to compare discriminability and response bias across the 
two lineup procedures. The SDT-CD model was designed to include filler identifications in the 
calculations. As the hierarchical confidence classification method does not provide this category, 
only the C3 confidence method was assessed. Following Palmer and colleagues’ (2010) 
approach, the best-fitting combination of d’ and c statistics were identified by comparing 
observed and model-generated response probabilities using likelihood ratio G-statistics (Sokal & 
Rohlf, 1981). During the model selection process, all parameters were considered within the 
range noted by Palmer and colleagues (2010; -1.59 to 4.01 for d’ and -3 to 3 for c). Previous 
eyewitness research using SDT-CD has used both simultaneous (e.g., Palmer et al., 2010) and 
sequential presentation methods (Palmer & Brewer, 2012). The integration rule has been 
previously applied to sequential lineup data (Palmer & Brewer, 2012). However, the proposed 
computation of a total score upon which to make a decision in the integration rule is conceptually 
problematic for use with a sequential procedure as well as with the C3 algorithm. As a result, 
only the independent observation model was considered. 
For each condition, G-tests were conducted to compare observed and model-generated 
expected frequencies for all response types (see Table 5). Using Excel solver, the total G-
statistics for each of the tests were optimized to find the best-fitting combination of d’ and c 
estimates (see Table 6). The results showed that the model fit the data for the independent rule, 
with both procedures producing non-significant total G values (all total Gs (df = 3) < 4.63, p > 
.10). The one exception to finding good fit was with young children’s C3 response classifications 
(G = 11.13, p <.001). This indicates that the independent observation model does not provide a 
good fit for younger children’s responses to the confidence procedure and, thus, interpretations 
of d’ and c should be made with caution. As good fit between our data and the model data was 
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found for the remaining groups, the model-generated estimates of d’ and c were used to represent 
discriminability and response bias (Duncan, 2006). Table 5 provides a breakdown of the SDT-
CD model results. 
Table 5 
Observed and (best-fitting) Independent Observation (IO) model-generated response proportions 
for target-present and target-absent lineups. 
  Target-Present  Target-Absent 
  Correct ID Filler ID Rejection  Filler ID Correct Rejection 
Younger  Categorical       
      Observed 0.41 0.25 0.34  0.41 0.59 
      IO Model 0.40 0.28 0.31  0.38 0.62 
 Confidence(C3)       
      Observed 0.45 0.10 0.45  0.43 0.57 
      IO Model 0.42 0.25 0.34  0.33 0.67 
        
Older Categorical       
      Observed 0.61 0.15 0.24  0.48 0.52 
      IO Model 0.60 0.22 0.18  0.42 0.58 
 Confidence(C3)       
      Observed 0.51 0.15 0.34  0.33 0.67 
      IO Model 0.50 0.21 0.30  0.29 0.71 
Note. ID = Identification 
Next, a bootstrapping procedure was used to estimate variance for the d’ and c statistics. 
In line with previous research (Palmer et al., 2010; Weber & Brewer, 2006), these variance 
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estimates were used to create .05 inferential confidence intervals for the statistics. Specifically, 
the response frequencies for each condition (observed data) were used as a sampling distribution 
from which 3000 replication data sets were randomly drawn (see Palmer et al., 2010). Next, 
optimized d’ and c statistics were calculated for each of these 3000 data sets that provided the 
distribution needed to calculate inferential confidence intervals (see Tryon, 2001). Non-
overlapping confidence intervals are indicative of a significant difference. As seen in Table 6, 
there are minimal differences in the estimated d’ values between the confidence (C3) and 
categorical conditions. In addition, the confidence procedure is associated with significantly 
more conservative responding than the categorical procedure. One consideration is that the SDT-
CD model assumes that the suspect is selected from the same distribution as the fillers. Given 
that the innocent suspect in the present study was selected as the lineup member who most 
closely resembled the target, this assumption was violated. Although this may have affected the 
estimation of d’, we can think of no reason the violation would differentially affect estimation 
across conditions. Nevertheless, caution should be taken when interpreting these values. Further, 
SDT indices should be used for relative comparisons, not as an absolute index of discrimination 
or bias.  
Table 6 
Independent Observation (IO) model-generated SDT-CD estimates of discriminability (d’), 
response bias (c) 
 Condition Estimated discriminability  Estimated response bias 
   .05 ICI   .05 ICI 
  d’ Lower Upper  c Lower Upper 
Younger Categorical 1.61 (0.20) 1.33 1.88  0.76 (0.10) 0.62 0.90 
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 Confidence (C3) 1.72 (0.19) 1.45 1.99  0.80 (0.10) 0.66 0.94 
Older Categorical 2.06 (0.16) 1.83 2.29  0.48 (0.09) 0.35 0.61 
 Confidence (C3) 1.98 (0..17) 1.74 2.21  0.74 (0.09) 0.62 0.86 
Note: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses; .05 ICI = Inferential Confidence Intervals. ICI allow 
for comparisons of d’ or c across procedures (C3 with Categorical) within each age group. 
Profiles of Individual Confidence-Accuracy Relationships 
The results presented thus far indicate the confidence procedure and the categorical 
procedure produce comparable response accuracy. This provides evidence that, at a group level, 
we can use children’s confidence ratings to infer lineup responses. However, in applied settings, 
criminal investigators will be interested in the accuracy of individual witness responses—not an 
entire group. To help with this, we used Brewer and colleagues’ (2012) profile analysis to 
highlight what individual sets or patterns of confidence ratings were likely (versus not likely) to 
indicate accurate discrimination between previously seen and previously unseen faces.  
Brewer and colleagues used a discrepancy score between the maximum rating and the 
next-highest rating on a 100-point scale. However, because we used a 5-point scale when 
adapting the task for children, variability in responses is smaller than for Brewer and colleagues. 
To overcome this, the profile analysis provides a classification-accuracy rate as a function of 
discrepancy between the maximum and the average of all other confidence values. For example, 
if the maximum confidence was 100% (4) and the average of the remaining ratings was 25% (1), 
the discrepancy would be 75% (3). We converted the 5-point scale into a grouped-discrepancy 
score (0 = 0%, 1 = 25%, 2 = 50%, 3 = 75%, 4 = 100%).  
We then completed the profile analysis using the same stipulations outlined by Brewer et 
al. (2012). That is, we only examined lineups in which a single maximum confidence rating was 
made and excluded filler identification responses in target-present lineups on the basis that they 
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would be a known incorrect selection in applied settings. Results of Brewer et al.’s (2012) profile 
analysis provide information about the probability that a suspect was the target at each level of 
discrepancy. Note that we also conducted the profile analyses using the same method described 
by Brewer and colleagues (2012) and this information can be found in the Online Supplementary 
Materials.  
As seen in Table 7, the results of the profile analysis show a similar linear relationship 
between discrepancy and accuracy that has been observed with adults (Brewer et al., 2012). One 
exception was that we did not observe 100% accuracy at the 100% level of discrepancy. For both 
the younger and older children, one child in a target absent condition incorrectly reported high 
confidence that an innocent lineup member was the guilty suspect. Thus, this procedure did not 
fully negate the problems associated with children’s identifications (e.g., lack of task 
understanding, pressure to assign a high value to indicate a ‘choice’). 
Table 7 
Proportion of correct decisions and number of responses for each category of discrepancy 
(between the maximum and the average of all other confidence values) for children in the 
confidence condition. 
 Profile Analysis 
 Younger Children  Older Children 
Discrepancy 
Number of 
responses 
Proportion 
correct 
 Number of 
responses 
Proportion 
correct  
100 5 0.80  7 0.86 
≥75 22 0.68  24 0.88 
≥50 56 0.46  47 0.72 
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≥25 83 0.36  73 0.53 
>0 87 0.34  73 0.53 
Note. Confidence was rated on a scale of 0 to 4 and was converted to a 0% to 100% scale.  
Discussion 
A frequently cited problem with child witnesses is that they are too lenient in their 
decisions—that is, they choose too frequently with categorical procedures (see Fitzgerald & 
Price, 2015). This high choosing rate may be partly explained by their use of overly-lenient 
response criteria (Dunlevy & Cherryman, 2013). We hypothesized that using this confidence 
procedure, and wresting control of the decision criterion away from the witness, would reduce 
problems associated with use of overly-lenient decision criteria and, in turn, reduce inappropriate 
choosing behavior. To explore this hypothesis, we first examined whether children could 
appropriately use confidence ratings to indicate the degree of match between previously seen and 
unseen faces. Then, we collapsed children’s ratings into categorical responses (using 
classification algorithms) to compare performance with a sequential procedure.  
Utility of the Confidence Procedure 
First, we assessed whether or not children could use the confidence rating procedure to 
accurately discriminate between previously seen and unseen faces. This research provides early 
evidence that confidence ratings can provide meaningful information about children’s 
recognition memory. This conclusion is based on three analyses. First, ANDI scores 
demonstrated that both younger (.20) and older (.24) children were able to use confidence ratings 
to discriminate between previously seen and unseen faces. Second, the algorithms were able to 
classify children’s responses such that suspect identification accuracy was above chance (50%). 
Third, the observed linear pattern between discrepancy and classification accuracy rates in the 
profile analysis (Table 7) demonstrates that children’s confidence ratings can be used to 
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effectively discriminate guilty from innocent suspects. These data demonstrate that both age 
groups of children can use confidence ratings to index likely guilt in a way that reduces or 
mitigates decision criteria influences, and permits a probabilistic assessment of identification 
evidence. This crucial finding provides the foundation for further exploration of procedures 
based on children’s confidence assessments.  
Confidence Ratings versus Categorical Identifications  
We also compared the responses from the confidence paradigm with those produced from 
a categorical procedure. A handful of studies have examined the confidence rating procedure 
with adult witnesses (e.g., Brewer et al., 2012; Sauer et al., 2008, 2012; Weber & Varga, 2012). 
Despite differences in the methodologies used by these studies and the present study (e.g., 
presentation style, age, confidence rating scale), a generally consistent finding is that 
classification algorithms can be applied to confidence ratings to produce results that are at least 
comparable, and often superior to performance using categorical procedures. In our research, the 
C3 and hierarchical confidence classification method produced very similar results to the 
categorical procedure for both age groups. Specifically, both classification algorithms produced 
comparable suspect identifications rates as well as comparable positive and negative response 
accuracy rates. The comparable performance provides evidence that we can use confidence 
ratings provided by children to index recognition memory at a level that is equivalent with a 
traditional categorical lineup procedure. These results support previous findings that children 
possess the metacognitive abilities to report confidence ratings that are sensitive to the nature of 
the stimuli (i.e., accurately discriminate between old and new stimuli; Hiller & Weber, 2013).  
 Age. Although exploring age differences was not a central focus of the present study, 
future research into age differences may help to better understand the mechanisms at play. We 
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did not observe an age-related effect on overall performance. This is somewhat surprising given 
that metacognitive development has been found to be an obstacle facing young children when 
providing confidence ratings (e.g., Brewer & Day, 2005; Keast et al., 2007). A lack of age 
effects may be explained by the coarse dichotomization of the age variable in the present study. 
Alternatively, our results could suggest that changing the decision task (from a task requiring 
children to compress all the information from a lineup into a single decision to one that focuses 
on each person in the lineup) to mitigate effects of criterion placement may attenuate age 
differences (Hiller & Weber, 2013).  
Future Research Considerations 
Our understanding of the value that the confidence procedure holds for use with child 
witnesses is in its infancy. This is the first study, to our knowledge, to apply this paradigm to a 
child sample. When we turn to the adult literature, there are some inconsistencies in the findings 
regarding the impact of using a confidence paradigm relative to a yes-no paradigm. These 
inconsistencies are due to the exploratory nature of the confidence paradigm and the 
classification algorithms involved. The classification methods that were first introduced (see 
Sauer et al., 2008) have evolved over time (Weber & Varga, 2012) and, we expect, will continue 
to do so.   
For these reasons, this research is currently most informative from a cognitive 
perspective, as it is premature to apply the confidence procedure to legal settings. However, there 
is value in considering the impact this sort of procedure may have on the legal system. For 
example, how will legal decision makers consider evidence based on confidence ratings, rather 
than a clear, categorical decision? . As indicated by previous research, hearing an eyewitness 
state ‘that’s the guy I saw’ is a powerful and persuasive form of evidence (e.g., Boyce, Lindsay, 
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& Brimacombe, 2008; Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, 1990). Not providing that information to 
decision makers in a legal setting may prove to be a challenge to those expecting finality in a 
witness statement. However, when considering the purpose of conducting a lineup task, there is a 
clear space for use of a confidence procedure in the legal system. And, although less traditional, 
Sauer, Palmer, and Brewer (2017) recently reported that mock-jurors are receptive to non-
categorical forms of identification evidence and, with coaching, can appropriately evaluate this 
type of evidence. As Charman and Wells (2007) point out, the aim of a police lineup is not to test 
the eyewitness but, rather, to gather evidence as to the guilt of a possible suspect. From this 
perspective, the confidence procedure may provide more valuable eyewitness evidence than the 
current lineup paradigms available to investigators.  
Confidence rating-based identification evidence has several advantages over a categorical 
identification. For instance, confidence ratings for each lineup member provide investigators 
with multiple points of information, including which member best matches a child’s memory of 
a perpetrator as well as the degree to which the best match is preferred, relative to the other 
members. Importantly, although collapsing patterns of confidence ratings into categorical 
classifications is useful for comparing performance against a traditional lineup procedure, this 
actually obscures some of this useful information. Recognition memory is not an “all or nothing” 
construct: The strength of recognition falls on a continuum. Thus, we argue that there is merit in 
encouraging legal decision-makers to shift from interpreting identification evidence as a clear-
cut indication of guilt toward a more probabilistic treatment of the evidence (Sauer & Brewer, 
2015). Moving from a categorical treatment of identification evidence to a ratings-based 
approach recognizes this distinction. The ratings-based approach allows for graded evidence 
against a suspect based on both the strength of the witness’s recognition of the suspect and the 
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witness’s ability to discriminate between the suspect and other lineup members. The potential 
value of this approach is evident in the linear relationship observed in the profile analysis 
reported in Table 7. As the level of discrepancy increases so, too, does the likely guilt of the 
suspect (see also Brewer et al., 2012). Thus, the most important aspect of the current findings 
may not be the actual accuracy rates observed, but the evidence that even younger children can 
use confidence ratings to discriminate guilty from innocent suspects.  
Moreover, many children provided multiple maximum ratings. In keeping with previous 
research (Sauer et al., 2008), responses from those who provided multiple max ratings were 
classified as rejections. However, there are nuances in these multiple maximum responses that 
may provide valuable information about memory strength. For example, does providing a 
maximum rating to four faces indicate a weaker memory than providing a maximum rating to 
only two faces? How informative is a child’s memory when he or she provides a maximum 
rating to the suspect, along with one other lineup member (versus two or three others)? There is a 
need to further explore the value of the confidence procedure as probabilistic evidence of suspect 
guilt, including whether the number of maximum ratings provided (and who they are given to) 
can be used as a supplemental index of recognition memory. 
The need for independent replication and applying this procedure more broadly are 
natural next steps. For example, the ecological validity of stimulus materials (e.g., live and/or 
emotionally arousing events) and lineup presentation methods (e.g., simultaneous presentation; 
video or live lineups) should be considered in future research. There is also a need to compare 
classification of confidence ratings to a sequential procedure that does not contain any interim 
confidence ratings. While we opted to include confidence ratings following each categorical 
decision to examine whether the confidence ratings can be used in conjunction with a categorical 
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decision, it is worthwhile to directly compare confidence ratings to a more ‘pure’ categorical 
rating of the overall lineup decision.  
Limitations. Eliciting a confidence rating for each lineup member may not completely 
avoid decision criteria influences that are observed with a categorical decision. Just as children 
may feel pressure to choose from a traditional lineup task, they may also feel pressure to provide 
at least one high rating. Children did not appear to use the confidence scale in a dichotomous or 
binary way (i.e., primarily selecting from either end of the scale); however, some children may 
have still felt pressure to provide a high rating to at least one lineup member. Because we did not 
attempt to asses if children felt obligated to assign a maximum value, we do not know the extent 
to which the confidence procedure assisted in avoiding decision criteria influence.  
 Finally, given that this was an initial exploration of children’s use of confidence ratings 
and we did not focus on exploring developmental differences, we did not have a sample size 
large enough to capture the nuanced differences that can be expected for children aged 6-7, from 
those who are 8-9, and beyond. Therefore, the lack of observable differences between age groups 
may be due to exploring age categorically, rather than continuously. Going forward, it would be 
beneficial to focus on a narrower age range of children or explore age continuously in order to 
learn more about developmental differences in use of confidence ratings. 
Conclusions 
These findings provide evidence that confidence ratings are a useful index of recognition 
for child eyewitnesses. When applied to child eyewitnesses, the confidence procedure can be 
used to provide categorical assessments of guilt that work as well as a standard, sequential 
procedure. However, the more important implication is that children can use a ratings-based 
procedure to discriminate between previously seen and unseen faces. In turn, this invites more 
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nuanced and empirical consideration of ratings-based identification evidence as a probabilistic 
index of guilt that may attenuate problematic social influences on child witnesses’ decision 
criteria. Taken together, the present findings suggest that further refining of the procedure, 
especially the use of children’s confidence ratings as probabilistic evidence of suspect guilt, is 
well worth consideration. 
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